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Introduction 
Bulgarian economy happened to be resilient to external shock, but more so after the 
introduction of the currency board arrangement in 1997.  It is not simply a merit of the 
arrangement per se but, practically speaking, it has helped to follow set of policies, which 
eventually offset negative developments on the international markets.  It is no accident – 
in early and mid-1990’s more crucial domestic policy deficiencies and constellations 
mediated external shocks.  In the cases of embargoes etc. they aggravated the negative 
impacts.  In cases of international market turbulence, they prevented the chocks.  In the 
post 1997 period, the economic restructuring is taking off from the limbo of the previous 
period.  At the same time, besides structural inefficiencies and the ambivalent impacts of 
external factors Bulgarian economy managed to reorient its markets from the ex-Eastern 
Block countries to the EU and the European free trade zone, and domestic economic 
structure is adjusting itself to this circumstances through increased FDI after 1998. 
Mismanagement of reforms (1990-1997) 
After 1989, only four years registered growth in real GDP.  In 1994, 1995 the growth was 
modest but fueled by indebtedness of the state owned enterprises, quasi- fiscal subsidies 
and international conjecture.  It reemerges in 1998 and 1999 on sounder fundamentals 
(stable currency, low inflation, bankrupted loss making enterprise, etc.).  2000 is likely to 
register growth of about 5% of GDP, thus completing a three-year test period for growth 
sustainability.  At the same time, since 1989, real GDP has lost more than one-third of its 
initial volume and the recovery is slow, reaching in 2000 72% of the pre-reform leve l. 
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Growth factors in 2000 
Bulgaria in 2000 is registering a third year of economic growth.  It is a sign of 
sustainability.  
 
Demand-side structure of GDP (1991, 1999 and 2000) 
 1991 1999 2000   
 
Private consumption 55.9 82.3  
Government consumption 17.2 8.4  
Investments  22.6 19.0  
Net exports 4.3 -7.7  
Source: NSI 
 
The table above compares the demand driving Bulgarian GDP since the start of the 
reforms in March 1991.  Preliminary data for 2000 demonstrate a restoration of the role 
of exports as a factor of GDP.  The significant fact is that it is the first development of the 
sort for ten years.  The big question mark, however, is whether it marks a beginning of a 
trend or simply due to conjecture factors.   
To answer this question, one should look at different domestic factors that are likely to 
support greater trade and growth potential.  For different factors I allocate different terms 
of contemporaneity.  As factors I select:  
· Average growth of GDP for certain periods, although there was a growth in 1998 
of 3.5%, I categorize this year to the previous period in order to “discount” a 
provisional impact of the economic inertia, and not to take into account the factor 
of the low starting point (the contraction of 1996 real GDP was 10.9%, in 1997 – 
6.9%); 
· Average export growth for the same periods; 
· Average growth of savings to GDP, this time the contemporary period includes 
1998, and it is compared to the years between 1995-1997 in order to avoid the 
sharpest decline in saving at the beginning of reforms; 
· Foreign direct investment and gross domestic investment (taken for the period of 
1994-1997 in order to skip the disinvestments in first reform years). 
 
Comparisons of selected growth factors for selected periods  
Indicators [Period] / percent [Period] / percent 
Average GDP growth 1990-1998 / - 3.9 1999-2000* / 3.3 
Average export growth 1990-1998 / 6.7 1999-2000 / 9.7 
Average savings to GDP 1995-1997 / 13.16 1998-2000 / 13.13 
Gross domestic investment 1994-1997 / 11.6 1998-2000 / 18.03 
Foreign direct investment 1990-1998 / 3.3 1999-2000 / 4.4 
Source: IMF, NSI, own calculations 
(*) – 2000 forecast. 
 
Growth trend seems to be reversed.  Investment is steadily higher in the last three years 
than in the previous period.  Foreign investment is higher than in years before 1998 but 
still unused factor.  Institutional background was also providing for greater government 
discretion, which allow eventually to mismanage the exchange rate and restored price 
controls and protectionism in 1995.  In addition, by the end of 2000 90% of Bulgarian 
banks are private and 70% of them – foreign.  No domestic political party is advocating 
major changes in the monetary or trade policies.  External policy framework of EU 
accession is an additional institutional constraint to domestic temptation for radical policy 
reversals.  
In addition, Bulgarian trade was converted from East to West under circumstances less 
favorable in 1998 – 2000 period, than they could be at early years of transition.   
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Source: NSI [Data on years before creation of CEFTA are for the member-countries.] 
 
Compared to Slovenia, which in 1991 had close to 60% of its trade with EU and EFTA, 
Bulgaria had to re-orient its trade from the same trade volume to then at the eve of 
dissolution CMEA, seeking other markets.  Bulgaria’s starting point of reforms was 
significantly worse than that of other emerging economies.  Also, Bulgaria lost markets 
in Iraq, Libya, and Iran.  Sanctions against Iraq and Libya blocked USD 2 billion of their 
debts to Bulgaria.1   
What exist is possible 
It is possible to compare the demographics of Bulgaria with its global share in FDI’s.  
Such a measurement has been proposed as a part of general bench-marking on Bulgaria’s 
economy by J.A. Austin Associates (JAA).  JAA compares Bulgaria’s FDI for a selected 
year with its share in the global population.  In 1998, the first year of a relative break 
through after the crisis of 1996-1997, Bulgaria attracted USD 401 million FDI’s, which 
put her on 61st place out of 162 countries on which information was available for the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  Between EU accession countries 
behind Bulgaria in that year we only three countries: Latvia, Slovenia and Cyprus.   
 
                                                 
1 It happened simultaneously with the default on foreign debt payment in March 1990, announced 
unilaterally by then communist cabinet.  It also happened at the eve of the first democratic general elections 
of the post-communist history of the country, held in June 1990.  Then elected new set of government had 
still to establish itself and simultaneously, in a condensed time -period, with the reorientation of trade to 
deal with debt rescheduling, launching reforms and constitution making.  The immediate victim of this 
agenda was not the constitution making, political reforms or the international relations but the consistency 
of economic reforms. 
Bulgaria’s share in global FDI flows 2  
Country
FDI in US$ 
Mill ions
Population 
Mil l ions
Share of 
Wor ld  
Population
Share of 
Global FDI
FDI per 
capita
FDI/ 
Population 
Ratio
Percentile 
Rank
Singapore $ 1 0 , 3 2 6 3 . 1 6 4 0 . 0 5 % 0 . 7 8 % 3 2 6 4 . 2 0 14.43 95
Ireland $ 4 , 0 3 8 3 . 7 0 5 0 . 0 6 % 0 . 3 0 % 1 0 8 9 . 8 8 4.82 88
Spain $ 3 2 , 5 3 9 3 9 . 3 7 1 0 . 6 7 % 2 . 4 5 % 8 2 6 . 4 7 3.65 83
Czech Republic $ 2 , 6 0 9 1 0 . 2 9 5 0 . 1 8 % 0 . 2 0 % 2 5 3 . 4 2 1.12 75
Hungary $ 2 , 4 1 4 1 0 . 1 1 4 0 . 1 7 % 0 . 1 8 % 2 3 8 . 7 2 1.06 73
Romania $ 2 , 0 4 0 2 2 . 5 0 3 0 . 3 8 % 0 . 1 5 % 9 0 . 6 5 0.40 53
Macedonia,  FYR $ 1 1 8 2 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 3 % 0 . 0 1 % 5 8 . 5 2 0.26 42
Bulgaria $401 8.257 0.14% 0.03% 48.61 0.21 37
Source: World Development Indicators, JAA calculations 
 
JAA assumption is that FDI/population ratio might be considered “fair” if it is at least 
close to 1.  Obviously this is a conventional assumption, but it helps comparisons.  While 
Bulgaria’s FDI share is six times smaller the share of the world population, Hungary and 
Czech republic, although with similar sized of population look considerably different. 
The development is the following.  In 1998, FDI’s as percent of GDP constituted 3.3%.  
A year later it almost doubled to 6.1%.  In the years after 1998 the inflow of FDI is on 
average 30% higher per annum.  Accumulated stock of foreign direct investment in 2000 
would be at least 21% of the GDP.  It would be twice less than the share of FDI’s to the 
GDP of Hungary but roughly the same percentage as in Poland. 
FDI’s per country of origin give more information on provisional trade developments.  
Presumably, the trade would be sustained or even improved if trade partners interweave 
respective economic entities and cooperate.   
In 1999 EU capital had 60% of the FDI’s in Bulgaria, in 2000 this share will be already 
63-64%.  (In terms of per capita the figure would almost double the amount of 1998.)  
Similar but higher shares of EU investment have Central European countries.3  On the 
SEE scene similar is the performance of Croatia and Romania.4  An interesting 
development is that of the Italian investment.  Italia use to be a prime trade partner for the 
last ten years, but in terms of direct investment she has been at bottom of the list with 
only USD 35 million.  In 2000, the fourth biggest Italian bank, with a major presence at 
the emerging European markets, Unicredito Italiano, bought the biggest Bulgarian bank.  
Thus Italy’s Bulgarian position as a second trade partner converted itself into a third 
investor.  The structural impact of such development cannot be underestimated: it has 
finalized the privatization of the Bulgarian banking sector, diversifying the foreign 
presence in accordance with the major trade and investment partners.5  As of the end of 
                                                 
2 Martin Webber, Kevin Murphy, Bulgaria’s Competitiveness Beyond 2000, J.A. Austin Associates, 
Washington DC, Sofia, 2000, p. 14. WDI figure for 1998 Bulgaria FDI is different from that officially 
accepted by Bulgaria’s Foreign Investment Agency; WDI does not takes into account reinvested earnings 
and credits, if we add to them the figure would be USD 620 million. 
3 Gabor Huya, FDI in SEE: Implementing Best Policy Practices, WIIW, 2000, p. 5. 
4 Ibid., p. 5-6. 
5 The EU ownership of the Bulgarian banking system is about 70%, with other investors like Societe 
Generale, National Bank of Greece, AIG, Raiffaisen Bank, ING, etc.  Structurally significant Italian 
investment is taking place on a smaller scale as well, e.g. a leading Italian woolen textile producer bought 
earlier this years one of the biggest Bulgarian factories (with 30% of the assets in the sector and 25% 
market share), inducing domestic rivalry and thus changing the future of the entire sub-sector in the 
2000, Germany, Belgium and Italy would amount to over 40% of the investment in 
Bulgaria. 
 
FDI by source and year (USD for 1992-2001**) 
Year Privatization Portfolio Greenfield Total per year 
1992   34 34 
1993 22 n.a. 80 80 
1934 134.2 n.a. 76 200.2 
1995 26 n.a. 136 162 
1996 76.4 n.a. 180 256.4 
1997 421.4 29.7 185 636.1 
1998 155.8 64.2 400 620 
1999 305.7 53.1 447 805.7 
2000* 480 20 500 1,000 
2001** 400 25 450 875 
Total period 2,021.5 192 2,488 4,701.5 
Source: Foreign Investment Agency (FIA), IME 
[*- FIA forecast, ** - IMEforecast.] 
 
Earlier foreign investors, like Belgium based Solvey and Union Miniere, have bought 
respectively major chemical plant producing soda and a copper smelter.  They build up 
their advantages on the originally subsidized in mid-1990 markets, restructured the 
enterprise and provided a bridge to a sustained exports without relying on quasi- fiscal 
transfers.  Similar developments take place in the textile and knitwear industry.  
 
Some additional comparisons and conclusions  
In 1999, FDI increased in Croatia and Bulgaria but declined in some other countries, e.g. 
in Macedonia and Romania.  Per capita inflow for Bulgaria is approximately 2.5 times 
less advantageous than for Croatia but as a percent of GDP the volumes are roughly 
comparable.  But it is also important that the combined FDI inflow for Southeast Europe 
in 1999 is 62% of the FDI to Czech Republic FDI for the same year.  
Cumulative inflow per capita since 1989 is comparatively very low, more than seven time 
less than in Hungary or six time less than in Czech Republic. 
 
Indicators of foreign direct investment in SEE economies (1998-1999 in million USD) 
Country FDI Cumulative  
 Inflow FDI abroad Net Inflow per 
capita 
% of GDP USD Per 
capita 
 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999 1999 1999 
Albania 45 41 - - 45 41 14 13 1.5 1.1 424 138 
BiH 100 60 - - 100 60 27 16 2.4 1.3 160 42 
Bulgaria 537 739 - -5 537 734 64 89 4.4 6.1 2,228 269 
Croatia 873 1,332 -83 -43 781 1290 195 298 4.0 6.6 3,552 793 
                                                                                                                                                 
textiles. 
Romania 2031 961 9 -12 2,040 949 90 43 4.9 2.8 5,441 243 
Macedonia 118 40 - - 118 40 59 20 3.4 1.1 217 108 
Source: UN/ECE secretariat 
 
EU has promptly become Bulgaria’s most important trade partner with relative share of 
Bulgarian trade of 74% for the period between 1993 and 1999.  At the same time the 
price for the trade reorientation was the low value added and losses in previously 
complex factors of production due again to the lack of FDI to compensate for these 
development.  The second trade partner for Bulgaria is SEE (including Turkey and 
Greece) with average share of 31% of Bulgarian trade over this seven years period.  On 
both EU and SEE Bulgaria had already repeatedly registered more exports than imports, 
and they constitute a natural venue of the domestic market enlargement.  This seems to be 
a major advantage for attracting FDI. 
Regarding Bulgaria peculiar history of FDI suggests that for the government there is 
limited space to maneuver relying predominantly of domestic savings and investment.  
Even in best years since 1998 FDI remain 3-4 lower than domestic investment. 
Privatization in pipeline includes limited number of high valued big companies in 
telecommunications, transport and power infrastructure, natural gas and tobacco 
monopolies.  Some of these companies, e.g. in telecommunications, are overstuffed with 
outdated equipment, and would be difficult to restructure.  Investment in power 
generation and distribution has the advantage of a large and provisionally greater SEE 
market.  Related to privatization circumstances for foreign investment are opportunities 
for re-privatization.  It stems from otherwise unfortunate fact that in 1998 and 1999 large 
amount (74 and 39% of respective annual “sales”) of formerly government owned 
companies were distributed to insiders, government appointees: many of them have 
already opted for resale. 
The second natural FDI channel, the capital market, remains underdeveloped. The 
situation is not likely to be improved in 2001. 
Since 1997, green-field FDI significantly outnumber investment through privatization 
and portfolio mechanisms.  For the time being opportunities have been and are expected 
to remain significant in the following areas: 
· Equity investment in competitive private companies; they are like everywhere and 
easy to recognize: they avoiding poor domestic demand, have strong forward 
integration, do not rely on government preference, apply strict internal quality 
control, innovate and perfect their product and services and work with education 
institutions; 
· Private provision of former government services in pensions and healthcare; 
· High-tech green-field in manufacturing, software industries, electronics, 
biotechnology and genetics, and ether-oils; 
· Electricity production and distribution, energy efficiency projects and services. 
 
